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One rationale for devolution is that local decision makers may be well
placed to adapt national policies to the local context. We test whether such
adaptation helps meet programme objectives in the case of the Apprenticeship
Grant for Employers. Originally a national programme, aimed at incentivising
employers to take on apprentices, reforms a few years into operation gave
some Local Authorities negotiated flexibilities in how the scheme operated.
We consider the impact of the national scheme and then use a difference-in-
differences approach to test whether flexibility led to an increase in the number
of apprenticeship starts in devolved areas relative to control groups. We find
that flexibility had zero effect. There is suggestive evidence that this is because
flexibilities were negotiated on the wrong margins.
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2 Fiscal Studies
I. Introduction
In recent years, there has been an incremental devolution of responsibilities
and powers from UK central government to local government. One rationale
for this devolution is that local areas may be better able to judge how to adapt
national policies to fit the local context. This devolution, at least so far, has
not involved a radical transfer of power. For example, the ‘city deals’ agreed
between 2011 and 2014 did not transfer general powers to Local Authorities
(LAs). Instead, they provided some cities, working with their Local Enterprise
Partnership (LEP), with a small amount of additional funding or powers to
be used flexibly.1 A few years into operation, the Apprenticeship Grant for
Employers (AGE), the focus of this paper, was ‘devolved’ to 40 LAs as part of
the city deals process. Originally a national programme, introduced in 2012,
AGE aimed to incentivise employers to take on apprentices. The incentive
aimed to encourage small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) to hire young
apprentices (aged 16–24) and comprised a £1,500 grant per apprentice over
and above ongoing subsidies to the cost of training paid independently of
the AGE scheme. When the national scheme was reformed a few years after
introduction, city deals areas negotiated additional flexibilities implemented
in either 2015 or 2016.
Local decision makers may be better placed to introduce flexibilities that
fit their context, providing they have good information and are able to balance
competing local interests. However, if such conditions are not met, negotiating
flexibilities might prove costly, in terms of time and resources, without
producing the hoped-for benefits. This paper demonstrates that, in the case of
AGE, well-intentioned efforts to negotiate local flexibilities do not appear to
have led to better outcomes. Both our own analysis, and results reported in the
evaluation of the national scheme,2 lead us to believe that this may partly be
explained by the fact that flexibilities were negotiated on the wrong margins.
The main flexibility ensured eligibility for larger firms whereas the national
scheme was predominantly used by very small firms. Compounding this,
existing evidence suggests that subsidies are not necessarily very effective for
increasing the take-up of apprentices. For example, Merrilees (1984) examined
a scheme with some similarities in Australia. This affected apprenticeship
starts for some trades but not for others, possibly because reducing the cost
of apprentices only affected demand where assistant tradespeople were widely
used (i.e. apprentices cannot substitute for the work of full tradespeople).
Reviews by the What Works Centre for Local Economic Growth (2015, 2017)
1In May 2015, legislation to ‘provide for the devolution of powers to cities with elected metro mayors,
helping to build a Northern Powerhouse’ was announced. The government invited areas to submit devolution
proposals to be considered during the 2015 Spending Review process. For further details, see https:
//publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201516/cmselect/cmcomloc/369/36904.htm#_idTextAnchor005.
2BIS, 2013.
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and OECD (Kuczera, 2017) find that financial incentives for apprenticeships
have modest effects and may involve substantial deadweight. Both recommend
careful monitoring and evaluation of the effects of financial incentives as
evaluation evidence is relatively thin.
To provide a benchmark for the impact of AGE flexibilities, we assess the
effect of the national scheme using administrative data on apprenticeship starts
at the LA level. To do this, we use ‘difference-in-differences’ to examine
whether its introduction saw starts increase more in eligible firms than in
non-eligible firms. To study the impact of AGE flexibilities, we then evaluate
the effect on apprenticeship starts of devolving AGE to 40 LAs (in 2015
or 2016) relative to a control group, again using a difference-in-differences
methodology. Our results are robust to using a matched sample of treatment
and control areas and to using synthetic controls.
In Section II, we explain AGE in more detail – how the scheme works and
how it has evolved. In Section III, we describe the data used for the analysis
and explain the methodology. Results for the national scheme and for AGE
flexibilities are presented in Section IV. We conclude in Section V.
II. The Apprenticeship Grant for Employers
The AGE was a lump-sum incentive scheme introduced nationally in February
2012. It had two main objectives: to encourage the hiring of young apprentices
and to increase the number of apprenticeships in small businesses.3 The
scheme paid a lump-sum incentive of £1,500 per apprentice aged 16–24
to SMEs with 250 or fewer employees, as long as they were ‘new to
apprenticeships’.4 The grant was set to £1,500 so that it would be large enough
to cover the early costs of the apprenticeship, but not ‘too generous’ so as to
generate the wrong incentives for firms.5,6 The incentive payment was over
and above the subsidies to support the direct cost of off-the-firm training and
assessment for apprentices. This subsidy applied to all firms hiring apprentices
and was, at the time, 100 per cent for apprentices aged 16–18 and 50 per
cent for those aged 19–24. The restriction to firms ‘new to apprenticeships’
was intended to expand the number of firms offering apprenticeships and to
reduce deadweight by avoiding the subsidy of apprenticeships that would have
3As discussed by Kuczera (2017), the idea of such lump-sum incentives is to increase the number of
apprentices by creating financial incentives for companies that have not provided apprenticeships previously.
While it might also be used to improve quality (e.g. by building training capacity within the firm), our data
only allow us to focus on the effect on apprenticeship numbers, the main objective of the scheme.
4‘New to apprenticeships’ was originally defined as never having had an apprentice or having not taken
on an apprentice in the last three years. At the end of August 2012, this was changed to ‘not in the last year’.
5BIS, 2013.
6‘The broad consensus was that £1,500 was ‘about right’: sufficient to cover an apprenticeship’s early
costs to the employer, which was seen as particularly important for very small businesses, but not such as
to constitute the employer’s only reason for taking on the young person (BIS, 2013, p.31).
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happened anyway. By the end of the first year of the scheme, eligibility was
extended to employers with up to 1,000 employees and the maximum number
of apprentices who could be taken on was increased from three to ten. The
scheme was closed on 31 August 2017.
At the end of 2012, the government commissioned an evaluation of the
scheme.7 The first part of the evaluation consisted of phone and face-to-face
interviews with employers, government officials, training providers and other
strategic partners (such as the Skill Funding Agency, Chambers of Commerce,
Local Authorities, etc.). This survey of recipients found that most employers
making use of AGE were small: 80 per cent employed 25 staff or fewer.
It also found that most recipients took on only one apprentice. The second
part of the evaluation consisted of a cost–benefit analysis, for apprentices,
employers and the local economy. The latter exercise is the most closely related
to our analysis. It is based on the number of AGE-funded starts, deflated
by an assumed deadweight of 22 per cent. The assumption on deadweight
was based on the percentage of AGE employers of apprentices aged 16–24
who, when surveyed, said that AGE made no difference to them taking on
an apprentice at the point at which they did so.8,9 We view these methods
for ‘estimating’ deadweight to be highly problematic and we take a more
robust approach to estimating the net impact of AGE, as described below. The
cost–benefit analysis does provide useful information on costs. As discussed
above, off-the-job costs were covered by a subsidy paid independently of AGE.
Apprenticeship wages accounted for a large fraction of on-the-job training
costs: estimated to be between £11,800 and £25,114 depending on the level,
duration and age of the apprentice.10 Supervisor costs represented another
important cost of on-the-job training and were estimated to be between £7,600
and £21,000, again depending on the level and duration. Administrative costs
were less important, ranging between £300 and £900 per apprenticeship. This
implies that the AGE payment would cover between 3 and 7 per cent of the
total costs incurred by firms.11
Figure 1 shows the evolution of apprenticeship starts by firm size in
our administrative data (discussed below). Consistent with the survey data,
7BIS, 2013.
8BIS, 2013.
9This figure comes from a survey of 500 employers out of a total of 24,000 apprentices. Taken at face
value (i.e. assuming that firms can correctly assess the counterfactual), there are still good reasons to think
this may underestimate deadweight given that AGE employers had to sign a declaration saying that they
could not hire an apprentice without the grant in order to receive payment.
10Apprentice age has direct and indirect effects on costs, which work in opposite directions. After the
first year of apprenticeship, older apprentices are paid more, increasing the wage cost. Offsetting this,
apprenticeships for the young are usually longer, increasing the total wage bill and the cost of supervision.
11BIS (2013) estimates an additional benefit to the firm by assuming that when the apprentice is working
rather than learning they are as productive as a worker with a qualification below Level 2, but they are paid
less. Allowing for this as well means that AGE would cover 12–22 per cent of the net costs.
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FIGURE 1
Number of apprenticeship starts for apprentices aged 16–24 by firm size
Source: Authors’ own calculations from Individualised Learner Record data.
small firms are more likely to take on apprentices both before and after the
introduction of AGE (in 2012, month 2). Based on the figure alone, it is hard
to see whether the number of starts increased more for eligible or ineligible
firms, but our regression results reported below suggest some differences pre-
and post-policy.
In the 2012–13 financial year, firms claimed around 30,000 AGE 16–24
apprenticeship payments (i.e. payments for apprentices aged 16–24).12 This
was substantially below the target of 40,000. However, this did not prevent
changes in January 2015 reducing the generosity of the national scheme
by restricting it to small firms with up to 50 employees that had hired no
apprentices in the previous year.13 As a result of these changes, several local
areas negotiated flexibilities as part of ongoing devolution deals with central
government. The ‘city deals’ involved a small amount of additional funding
provided by central government to be used flexibly for specific programmes,
the outcomes of which AGE was a relatively small part (although the only part
12BIS, 2013.
13Firms could now only receive up to five grants rather than up to ten, although in practice very few firms
hired more than one apprentice under the scheme.
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directly concerned with apprenticeships). For example, some of the deals also
provided selective, additional borrowing capacity, retention of some, or all, of
any growth in income from business rates and greater influence over a number
of programmes formerly delivered by government departments, their agencies
and contractors.14
AGE flexibilities were agreed with groupings of LAs that formed, or were
planning to form, Combined Authorities (CAs). About 20 LAs gained AGE
flexibilities in 2015 (all in Greater Manchester CA, West Yorkshire CA and
Sheffield City Region) and another 20 gained flexibilities in 2016 (in the West
of England, Liverpool City Region, Cambridgeshire and Peterborough and
Tees Valley).15 A full list is provided in online Appendix A.
Table 1 provides an overview of negotiated AGE flexibilities. As is clear
from the table, there are aspects of AGE flexibility that are specific to different
groups of LAs. Most of them had flexibility in the types of firms that were
eligible to claim the subsidy. For example, all but one maintained eligibility for
firms with up to 250 employees (at least for a certain number of apprentices;
and conditional on not having employed apprentices in the previous year).16
In contrast, the national scheme restricted eligibility in all other LAs to small
firms (with up to 50 employees) from January 2015 onwards. While LAs differ
on precise details, most of them diverged from the national scheme in a way
to make the local scheme more generous overall by expanding eligibility and
increasing the incentive payment in many cases. Given this, and the detailed
differences in area-level flexibilities, we focus on evaluating the overall effect
of AGE flexibilities.
In the remaining sections, we first consider the impact of the national
scheme before investigating whether flexibilities translated into more
apprenticeship starts in devolved areas than might have been expected if they
had implemented the revised national scheme.
III. Data and methodology
We use Individualised Learner Record (ILR) data – administrative data on all
publicly funded apprenticeships in England between 2011 and 2017. This data
set provides information on several characteristics of both the apprentice and
the apprenticeship but not a detailed measure of employer size. We use the
ILR matched to the Employer Data Service (EDS) to give us a better estimate
14The fact that AGE flexibilities were part of a broader package limits concerns over the self-selection
of LAs into treatment based on pre-existing trends in apprenticeship numbers. It does raise the possibility
that other devolution policies might offset any positive effect of AGE flexibilities. We find it hard to think
what these might be and, as we report below, pre-policy trends in apprenticeship numbers suggest this is not
a major concern.
15Suffolk and Norfolk had flexibilities for four months only in 2016. They are excluded from the analysis.
16In Sheffield, this was up to 100 employees.
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of firm size in 2017. Given the relatively short time period, and the broad
banding for AGE eligibility, mismeasurement of firm size is unlikely to be
a major concern.17 Given our focus on AGE flexibilities at the LA level, we
define LAs as our unit of analysis and aggregate data by LA, month and firm
size.
We first consider the impact of the national scheme. As this was introduced
everywhere at the same time, it is more difficult to estimate a causal effect
than when considering the impact of flexibilities. We exploit the fact that
eligibility for the national scheme varied by firm size, where firms with over
1,000 employees were never eligible. We estimate the following equation:
ln(ya f t ) = γ
(
Treat f × Postt
) + ∂Treat f + dt + μa + εa f t .(1)
Here, ln(ya f t ) is the (log + 1) total number of relevant apprenticeship starts
in a given area (a) and given time (month and year) in firms of a given
size (f).18Treat f = 1 for firms with fewer than 1,000 employees. Postt = 1
from the date the national policy was introduced. Treat f × Postt = 1 for
treated firms after the national policy was introduced, and therefore γ is the
coefficient of interest that captures the effect of treatment. dt are dummies for
each month–year combination. We control for area fixed effects (μa), which
removes the influence of time-invariant factors that might affect the number
of apprentices. εat is the error term.19 We estimate this regression separately
comparing number of starts by LA in firms of different sizes (treated firms
with 1–50, 1–250 or 251–1,000 employees) to the number of starts by LA for
firms with more than 1,000 employees (the control group). In online Appendix
B, we also report results from an event study that allows us to consider whether
treatment groups look different from the control group in the six months prior
to the introduction of the national policy. We estimate these regressions where
the dependent variable is the number of apprenticeship starts for those aged
16–24 and the number of apprenticeship starts for those aged over 24. While
we might expect the latter not to be affected by the national policy (as there was
no explicit incentive to hire older workers), we cannot rule out the possibility
of spillover effects due to complementarities or the possibility that the subsidy
attached to younger workers relaxed financial constraints on firms of hiring
older workers.
17For a shorter time period (2011–15), we also have firm data from the Inter-Departmental Business
Register (IDBR). Given the available time period, we cannot use these data to evaluate the effects of AGE
flexibilities. Estimating the effect of the national policy using both data sources (EDS and IDBR) produces
qualitatively similar results.
18Given differences in the total number of apprentices across areas, the estimates in logs are easier to
interpret (although results when estimating in levels are not very different).
19The inclusion of time-varying characteristics of LAs (e.g. such as those included in Table 2) makes no
difference to the coefficients of interest.
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We can evaluate the effects of flexibilities more rigorously because
devolution did not happen everywhere. As with the national policy, we
estimate the effect of flexibilities on the number of area-level apprenticeship
starts. There are two ‘treatment groups’ comprised of LAs granted flexibilities
in either 2015 (AGE 2015) or 2016 (AGE 2016). The control group comprises
the other LAs that were never granted flexibilities (of which there are 270). In
a refinement of this approach, we estimate regressions on a subset of LAs that
have ‘common support’. This is established by estimating the propensity score
for being a treatment area on the basis of observable characteristics in the year
prior to the start of AGE flexibilities and then trimming the sample such that
only treatment and control LAs within the same range are used for the analysis.
The procedure is described in online Appendix C. Trimming substantially
reduces the number of control areas while only reducing the treatment areas
by one or two LAs.
Whether applied to the full sample or the sample of LAs sharing common
support, the methodology involves estimating whether apprenticeship starts
(aged 16–24) increased in devolved areas relative to a control group, in
comparison with previous time periods.20 This ‘difference-in-differences’
analysis can be specified as
ln(yat ) = β (Treata × Postat ) + dt + μa + εat,(2)
where ln(yat ) is the (log + 1) total number of relevant apprenticeship starts
in a given area (a) and given time (defined by month and year).21 Treata
= 1 for all devolved areas. Postat = 1 for the period after the devolution.
Treata × Postat = 1 for the treated areas post-devolution. Therefore, β is the
coefficient of interest that captures the effect of treatment. dt are dummies for
each month–year combination. We control for area fixed effects (μa), which
removes the influence of time-invariant factors that might affect the number
of apprentices. εat is the error term.22 We estimate this regression separately
for all firms and firms of 51–250 employees (i.e. those not eligible for the
national scheme at the time of devolution) as well as separately for AGE
2015 and AGE 2016 areas. We also estimate a regression for firms with up
to 50 employees, even though they continued to be eligible for the national
scheme. This enables us to further evaluate the impact of devolution for firms
that continue to be eligible for the nationally determined payment but where
devolved LAs may have made the system more generous for those firms within
20We exclude those aged 25+ because of the possibility of substitution between younger and older
apprentices on account of the incentive scheme.
21Given differences in total number of apprentices across areas, the estimates in logs are easier to
interpret (although results when estimating in levels are not very different).
22Including time-varying characteristics of LAs (e.g. such as those included in Table 2) makes no
difference to the coefficients of interest.
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a narrower range of parameters (such as the amount of subsidy). We have also
estimated an ‘event study’ where being in a treatment area is interacted with
every time period (defined by month and year). This enables us to check for
differential trends in treatment and control areas prior to the flexibilities being
introduced.
Standard errors are clustered at the LA level. All the regressions are
weighted by the annual population of the LA. This is to account for the
differing size of each LA (although the unweighted results are not very
different).
In addition to estimating on common support, we further check the
robustness of our results by using the synthetic control method developed
by Abadie and Gardeazabal (2003) and Abadie, Diamond and Hainmueller
(2010, 2015). The synthetic control group is created as a weighted average of
several untreated units. The weights are defined by ‘matching’ pre-treatment
covariates and outcomes such that the synthetic control is as similar as possible
to the treated area before the start of the treatment.23 The method is further
explained in online Appendix D.
This uses the idea that in some cases a weighted combination of units may
be a better comparison group than any unit on its own. It may be particularly
useful for AGE 2015 areas, which are quite different from the other LAs.24
Table 2 shows that, on average, they are more populous, more likely to be
rural and have many more small firms than areas in either the AGE 2016 or
never devolved groups. The treatment and control groups already look much
more similar when the sample is trimmed based on common support (shown
in online Appendix C), as described above. The use of synthetic controls
provides an alternative way of achieving the same outcome. In practice, as
discussed below, we do not see much difference between results using these
two robustness checks.
IV. Results
We start by considering the impact of the national scheme. Results from the
event study, reported in online Appendix B, suggest that treated units look
similar to the control group in the six months prior to the introduction of
23We use as covariates the number of firms in each area by size, the total population, the percentage of the
population living in a rural area, the percentage female and the percentage ethnic minority, the percentage
of inhabitants aged 16–64, the percentage of those aged 16–64 with higher education (above level 4) and of
those with no qualifications, the percentage of employees aged 16–64 receiving work-related training, the
percentage of those aged 16–64 who are employed, economically active, and unemployed, and, finally, the
percentage of self-employed (for workers aged 16+). The matched outcome variable is the log number of
apprenticeships starts.
24When estimating the synthetic control method for AGE 2015 areas, we need to estimate the effect for
West Yorkshire separately as this had a slightly different start time from other areas.
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TABLE 2















Total population, of which 155,635 328,039 172,404*** 195,335 39,700
% Female 51.3 51.1 −0.2* 51 −0.0
% Ethnic minority 10.3 11.2 0.9 5 −5.3***
% 16–64 population 62.8 63.9 1.1** 64 0.9
% Population in rural area 32.0 7.5 −24.5*** 23 −9.1
For population aged 16–64:
% No academic qualification 8.2 11.0 2.8*** 10 1.7**
% NVQ Level 4 qual. or above 35.7 30.1 −5.6*** 33 −3.2
% Economically active 78.8 75.6 −3.2*** 77 −2.1**
% Unemployment rate 6.1 7.9 1.8*** 8 1.4**
% Employees getting work-related
training (last month)
10 10 −0.4 10 −0.4
Number of firms by number of
employees (in 2014):
1–9 5,258 7,748 2,490*** 4,803 −455
10–49 549 995 444*** 589 40
50–249 96 184 88*** 107 11
250+ 24 42 18** 25 1
Number of LAs 270 20 20
Note: The first panel provides statistics for the total population, the second panel for the population aged
16–64 and the third panel for firm size based on the total number of employees. ***, ** and * indicate
significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.
Source: Annual Population Survey (NOMIS), 2011–2016; UK Business Counts (NOMIS), 2014.
the national policy.25 However, as discussed above, we have very limited pre-
treatment data so we focus on the difference-in-difference estimates. These
are reported in Table 3 for the number of starts by LA in firms of different
sizes (treated firms with 1–50, 1–250 or 251–1,000 employees) compared
with the number of starts by LA for firms with more than 1,000 employees
(the control group). Panel A shows results where the dependent variable is
apprenticeship starts of individuals aged between 16 and 24. Panel B shows
results for individuals over the age of 24.
Panel A shows positive treatment effects for all firm size groups. The
estimated effects are larger for small firms consistent with BIS (2013), which
25The one exception is the number of LA starts in firms with 251–1,000 employees. In this case,
apprenticeship starts were lower in treated units than in control units, both before and after the national
policy was introduced.
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TABLE 3














Panel A: treatment group versus
control group for 16–24
apprenticeship starts
Treated * Post 0.350*** 0.242*** 0.170***
(0.031) (0.029) (0.041)
Number of observations 46,688 26,568 26,568
Adjusted R2 0.814 0.828 0.697
Panel B: treatment group versus
control group for 24+
apprenticeship starts
Treated * Post 0.607*** 0.476*** 0.147***
(0.033) (0.033) (0.040)
Number of observations 46,688 26,568 26,568
Adjusted R2 0.724 0.750 0.643
Note: Dependent variable is log (number apprenticeship starts per month + 1). ***, ** and * indicate
significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. Standard errors clustered at LA level reported in parentheses.
Observations are LA by month and year. For firms with 50 or fewer employees, we use data from August
2011 to April 2017. For firms up to 250 and firms 251–1,000 employees, we use data from August 2011 to
December 2014 because firms with over 50 employees stopped being eligible for AGE from January 2015.
reports that the policy had higher take-up among small firms. These results
are consistent with a positive effect of the national policy on apprenticeship
starts at eligible firms, with the strongest effects felt for the smallest firms.
Note, however, that Panel B also shows significant point estimates for
apprenticeship starts for individuals aged over 24 who were ineligible for
the policy. Indeed, for the first two columns, the estimated effects are
considerably larger. There are at least two explanations. First, it is possible
that the national AGE scheme did not have a genuine effect on apprenticeship
starts – and that common national factors drove up apprenticeship starts
amongst individuals of any age around the time the policy was introduced.
Second, there could be complementarities between the hiring of apprentices
aged 16–24 (i.e. the target of the AGE policy) and the hiring of older
apprentices. Thus, while the evidence is consistent with the national scheme
having increased apprenticeship starts, we cannot rule out other causes for this
increase.
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FIGURE 2
Average number of monthly apprenticeship starts per LA, by AGE treatment group
Note: AGE 2015, AGE 2016 and Never developed are groupings of LAs as defined in the text.
Source: Authors’ own calculations from ILR data.
1. Devolution: descriptive statistics
We now turn to the impact of AGE flexibilities. Before reporting regression
results, we consider the raw data on the average monthly number of
apprenticeship starts by LA for those aged 16–24 in the treatment groups
(AGE 2015 and AGE 2016) and the control group for the full sample (the
‘Never devolved’ areas). Numbers of starts from August 2011 to April 2017
are plotted in Figure 2, and starts per 10,000 inhabitants over the same time
period are plotted in Figure 3. The vertical lines indicate when flexibilities
were introduced in AGE 2015 and AGE 2016 areas, respectively. Neither plot
shows any marked change in the number of apprenticeship starts in treatment
areas (relative to control areas) coinciding with policy implementation. Of
course, it might be that there are small changes that are not picked up by visual
inspection but that can be detected in the regression analysis.
2. Difference-in-differences
Table 4 shows results from the difference-in-differences specification
(equation 2), reporting estimates of the coefficient of interest: the effect of
© 2020 The Authors. Fiscal Studies published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd. on behalf of Institute for Fiscal Studies
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FIGURE 3
Number of monthly apprenticeship starts per LA (per 10,000 inhabitants), by AGE
treatment group
Note: AGE 2015, AGE 2016 and Never developed are groupings of LAs as defined in the text.
Source: Authors’ own calculations from ILR data.
introducing flexibilities in treatment areas relative to control areas. The upper
panel shows results for all LAs and the lower panel shows results for LAs that
have ‘common support’. Results are estimated separately for AGE 2015 areas
(columns 1, 3 and 5) and AGE 2016 areas (columns 2, 4 and 6). They are
reported for all firms (columns 1 and 2), the subgroup of firms with 51–250
employees (columns 3 and 4) and for firms with up to 50 employees (columns
5 and 6). Firms of 51–250 employees were eligible to receive the subsidy in
all but one of the devolved areas (after the policy was introduced) but not in
control areas. Firms with up to 50 employees were eligible for the subsidy both
nationally and in the devolved areas. Thus, for those firms with 50 or fewer
employees, any ‘treatment effect’ would be attributable to increased generosity
or better targeting in devolved areas. The pattern of results is the same across
all specifications. The treatment effect is small, negative and not statistically
different from zero in all but two cases.
Figures 4 and 5 show an event study for total number of apprenticeships by
LA for the sample with common support for AGE 2015 and AGE 2016 areas,
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TABLE 4
Difference-in-differences results for number of apprenticeship starts by
LA and firm size
All firms Firms with 51–250
employees




















(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
All LAs
Treated * Post −0.019 −0.026 −0.068 −0.082 −0.021 −0.060**
(0.016) (0.026) (0.044) (0.064) (0.027) (0.024)
Number of obs. 20,010 20,010 19,734 20,010 19,734 20,010
Adjusted R2 0.909 0.897 0.722 0.697 0.890 0.879
LAs with common
support
Treated * Post −0.022 −0.051** 0.015 −0.090 −0.028 −0.043
(0.020) (0.025) (0.047) (0.087) (0.036) (0.038)
Number of obs. 3,657 10,833 3,519 10,143 3,519 10,143
Adjusted R2 0.920 0.920 0.654 0.686 0.873 0.880
Note: Dependent variable is log (number apprenticeship starts per month + 1) as discussed in the text.
Estimation is over the time period from August 2011 to April 2017. ***, ** and * indicate significance
at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. Standard errors clustered at LA level reported in parentheses. The
regressions control for LA and month–year dummies. The second panel restricts the analysis to areas with
common support on the propensity score.
respectively.26 The timing of flexibilities is denoted by t and the figures plot
coefficients for a set of six-month-period dummies interacted with treatment
status from up to 60 months before the policy to up to 24 months afterwards.27
The coefficients on the interacted dummies are insignificant in all time periods.
In other words, consistent with our difference-in-difference results, devolved
areas did not have more apprenticeship starts than non-devolved areas, either
before or after additional flexibilities were introduced in 2015 and 2016
respectively.28 The event study for firms with 51–250 employees tells a similar
story, though with much wider confidence intervals around estimates (and
hence the associated figures are not reported).
26The plot looks very similar for the full sample. However, for the full sample more coefficients are
significant in the pre-policy period, suggesting the existence of differential trends in treatment and control
areas if we do not restrict the sample to LAs with common support.
27The reference period for both Figures 4 and 5 is the same, from August 2011 to April 2017. However,
because flexibilities came into effect at different times in different areas the number of lags and leads
changes.
28There is only one point estimate in the ‘pre-policy’ period that is statistically different from zero for
AGE 2016 areas. But this a long time (t − 60) before the policy starts in these areas. All other point estimates
are not statistically different from zero either before or after the policy is introduced.
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FIGURE 4
Event study for total number of apprenticeship starts by LA for AGE 2015 areas
(common support sample)
Note: The figure plots coefficients for a set of six-month-period dummies interacted with treatment status
from up to 48 months before the policy (for West Yorkshire CA) to up to 24 months afterwards (for Greater
Manchester CA and Sheffield City Region). The devolution started in April 2015 for Greater Manchester
CA and Sheffield City Region, and in August 2015 for West Yorkshire CA. Analysis is restricted to areas
with common support on the propensity score.
3. Synthetic control method
The results from the synthetic control method are illustrated in Figure 6 for
the full sample of firms, with more explanation of results in online Appendix
D.29 Figure 6 illustrates the gap in the number of apprenticeship starts between
the devolved areas and the synthetic control group for each time period. A
horizontal line at zero in the pre-treatment period would indicate that the
synthetic control closely matches the treatment group before the introduction
of flexibilities. For AGE 2015, we observe a steady pattern in the pre-treatment
period. There is a slight downward-sloping pattern for AGE 2016, which starts
in the pre-treatment period and seems to attenuate in the post-intervention
period. Overall, however, it fluctuates around zero in both the pre- and
29For the synthetic control method, West Yorkshire CA is excluded from the AGE 2015 areas because it
implemented the policy slightly later. Results for West Yorkshire CA only are very similar to those reported
for other AGE 2015 areas.
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FIGURE 5
Event study for total number of apprenticeship starts by LA for AGE 2016 areas
(common support sample)
Note: The figure plots coefficients for a set of six-month-period dummies interacted with treatment status
from 60 months before the policy to 8 months afterwards. The devolution started in August 2016. Notice
that t + 12 includes only two months (March and April 2017). Analysis is restricted to areas with common
support on the propensity score.
post-treatment periods, and it is usually contained between −0.2 and 0.2 logs.
These results confirm those of our main analysis, suggesting no significant
effect of the increased flexibility.
4. Effects on ineligible workers?
As a final exercise we consider whether there are any differences pre- and
post- policy in devolved areas for workers who were aged over 24 and thus
ineligible for the grant. To do this, Table 5 replicates Table 4 for workers aged
25 and older. As before, we show results from the difference-in-differences
specification (equation 2). The upper panel shows results for all LAs and the
lower panel shows results for LAs that have common support.
This exercise enables us to comment more closely on whether areas
extending the scheme were cutting back on training faster than in other areas.
As with Table 4, the treatment effect is small and not statistically different
from zero in all but two cases. The exception is for small firms in AGE 2016
areas, which are less likely to hire older apprentices in the post-policy period.
We found the same result in Table 4 when considering all LAs (upper panel).
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FIGURE 6
Gap in (log) total number of apprenticeship starts between devolved area and the
synthetic control group
Note: Results from synthetic control estimated for the full sample of firms. The AGE 2016 group is excluded
from estimation for AGE 2015, and vice versa. The devolution started in April 2015 for AGE 2015 areas.
Note that as West Yorkshire CA is excluded from the analysis there are fewer lags (pre-policy) for AGE
2015 areas than in Figure 4. The devolution started in August 2016 for AGE 2016 areas.
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TABLE 5
Difference-in-differences results for number of apprenticeship starts by LA and firm
size (employees aged 25+)
All firms Firms with 51–250
employees




















(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
All LAs
Treated * Post 0.029 −0.025 0.064 0.028 0.020 −0.086**
(0.026) (0.046) (0.067) (0.068) (0.028) (0.041)
Number of obs. 20,010 20,010 19,734 20,010 19,734 20,010
Adjusted R2 0.843 0.826 0.591 0.571 0.801 0.786
LAs with common
support
Treated * Post 0.025 −0.033 0.065 0.031 0.046 −0.107**
(0.031) (0.049) (0.162) (0.085) (0.062) (0.053)
Number of obs. 3,657 10,833 3,519 10,143 3,519 10,143
Adjusted R2 0.870 0.852 0.548 0.556 0.769 0.786
Note: Dependent variable is log (number apprenticeship starts per month + 1) as discussed in the text.
Estimation is over the time period from August 2011 to April 2017. ***, ** and * indicate significance
at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. Standard errors clustered at LA level reported in parentheses. The
regressions control for LA and month–year dummies. The second panel restricts the analysis to areas with
common support on the propensity score.
When using common support and eligible apprentices, the negative coefficient
appeared for all firms in AGE 2016 areas (Table 4), rather than firms with
up to 50 employees (Table 5). Overall, these results do not suggest that
devolved policy protected younger apprentices, relative to older apprentices,
from changes in economic conditions that might have affected devolved areas
differentially over the same period as the policy changes.
V. Conclusion
Devolution of skills policy in England started incrementally but is becoming
more important. For example, from 2019, about half of the overall Adult
Education Budget will be devolved to mayoral Combined Authorities across
England. Many of these areas are the same as those that negotiated flexibilities
for AGE. In this paper, we show that all the hard work in negotiating these
flexibilities made no measurable difference to the number of apprenticeship
starts in devolved areas.
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A plausible explanation is that flexibilities were negotiated on the wrong
margins. The evaluation of the national scheme30 suggested that take-up was
much more prevalent among very small firms than in any other group. To
the extent that the national policy was effective for increasing apprenticeship
starts, it was most effective for very small firms. Thus, it is arguable that more
effort in devolved areas should have been made to make the system more
generous for those firms, rather than expanding subsidies to larger firms where
take-up had been poor in the national scheme. This suggests that local decision
makers who were negotiating flexibilities either had information constraints
(i.e. they did not know about the experience in the national scheme) or were
influenced by the wrong stakeholders (e.g. larger local employers). It is also
possible that the form of devolution on offer was simply too incremental to
be useful at the local level. The more general point is that devolution needs
to be accompanied by structures to discern carefully how to use resources
effectively in the local context. Otherwise, there is a danger that devolution
multiplies bureaucracy (with associated costs) while doing little or nothing for
local economic growth.
Supporting information
Additional supporting information may be found online in the Supporting
Information section at the end of the article.
• Online Appendix
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